These 1: Armee weit weg stationieren

Hassan II, twice victim of coup attempts and for years
at war with the left, used Western Sahara to bolster nationalism
and park his army far away in the desert.

These 2: Der König Mohammed VI: More by love than fear

King Mohammed VI is more secure, maintained in power
more by love than fear and facing no apparent major domestic
threat. He recently has somewhat distanced himself
from the issue, however, and has not visited
the territory in three years, a stark contrast to hisperipatetic ribbon
cutting throughout the Kingdom.

These 3: Die Region ist erfolgreich konsolidiert worden

Despite some siphoning,the investment has produced higher levels
of urban development than in comparably
sized cities in Morocco proper and made
the capital, Laayoune, the first city without
any shantytowns. Social indicators such as
access to and level of education and availability
of health care and social facilities
exceed Moroccan norms
and far surpass those in comparably
sized Morocco,s cities. Growth in Morocco has
made
these expenditures much more bearable to Rabat,s
exchequer than they once were.

These 4: Kritische Artikel über die Westsahara wurden nicht unterdrückt

In April 2009, a local weekly newsmagazine TelQuel
published an article laying out and likely even exaggerating
what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that
the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since
1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per
year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal
Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no
consequences for the article. Even with the relative
expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover
subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.)

These 4 a: „cuba-like Polisario“ verliert an Sympathien

Voter participation in the Sahara, stoked by clan
rivalries, was far above the norm, despite a
Polisario-declared boycott. Some pro-independence Sahrawis
reportedly voted for the Ould er Rachid because they alone
were deemed strong enough to stand up to the government in
Rabat. This real political competition, while perhaps not
democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario
system. It underscores the fact that there is a significant
part of the population of the Sahrawi territory, in addition
to most immigrants, who support Moroccan sovereignty.

These 5: Geopolitik und nicht Minderheitenpolitik

Curiously, we know of no advocate of independence
that has ever claimed the &Sahrawi8 territories in Morocco,
Algeria or Mauritania as part of a national homeland,
although some members of the CORCAS unsuccessfully tried to
include the Moroccan parts in the autonomous region, when it
was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism,
along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania
--the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is
less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older
dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the
case for an independent state.

These 6: Veränderungen sind seit 2008 greifbar

Since mid-2008, once common beatings and arbitrary
imprisonment have also essentially ceased. One key to the
reduction in abuses last year was the transfer of
long-serving security officials with consistent records as
abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that
more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place,
and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All
sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful
for some political progress.

These 7: Was die Leute selbst wollen in der Westsahara

Extensive interviews and independent sources in the
territory suggest that the principal goal of most Sahrawis is
more self-government than self-determination; a desire more
for protection and identity than independence, an army and
embassies. The small vocally pro-Polisario minority,
including many of the human rights activists, formerly
enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these
Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression.
Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support.
The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been
intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally
quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario
activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in
a free election held now a majority of voters in the
territory would choose autonomy.

These 8: Was macht Putin in der Region?

The international community is ready to support
Maghreb rapprochement and integration, which can only occur
in parallel with a settlement of the longstanding dispute
over the Western Sahara and resettlement of the
long-suffering refugees. Then-President Putin of Russia
urged Algerian-Moroccan compromise in vain, as have the
French, the Spanish, and the USG. We are not aware of any of
the P-5 opposing an autonomy-based solution, nor have we seen
real urgency or priority for the international community to
resolve a dispute over which there has been no real fighting
for 18 years.